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Abstract
We study confidentiality enforcement in ontologies
under the Controlled Query Evaluation framework,
where a policy specifies the sensitive information
and a censor ensures that query answers that may
compromise the policy are not returned. We focus
on censors that ensure confidentiality while max-
imising information access, and consider both Dat-
alog and the OWL 2 profiles as ontology languages.
1 Introduction
As semantic technologies are becoming increasingly mature,
there is a need for mechanisms to ensure that confidential data
is only accessible by authorised users.
Controlled Query Evaluation (CQE) is a prominent con-
fidentiality enforcement framework, in which sensitive in-
formation is declaratively specified by means of a policy
and confidentiality is enforced by a censor. When given a
query, a censor checks whether returning the answer may
lead to a policy violation, in which case it returns a dis-
torted answer. The CQE framework was introduced in
[Sicherman et al., 1983], and studied in [Biskup and Bon-
atti, 2001; Biskup and Bonatti, 2004; Bonatti et al., 1995;
Biskup and Weibert, 2008] for propositional databases. It
has been recently extended to ontologies, where different for-
malisations have been proposed [Bonatti and Sauro, 2013;
Cuenca Grau et al., 2013; Studer and Werner, 2014].
We study CQE for ontologies that are expressed in the
rule language Datalog as well as in the lightweight descrip-
tion logics (DLs) underpinning the standadised profiles of
OWL 2 [Motik et al., 2012]. We assume that data is hid-
den, and users access the system by a query interface. An on-
tology, which is known to users, provides the vocabulary and
background knowledge needed for users to formulate queries,
as well as to enrich query answers with implicit information.
Policies, formalised as conjunctive queries, are available only
to system administrators, but not to ordinary users. The role
of the censor is to preserve confidentiality by filtering out
those answers to user queries that could lead to a policy vio-
lation. In this setting, there is a danger that confidentiality en-
forcement may over-restrict the access of the user. Thus, we
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focus on optimal censors, which maximise answers to queries
while ensuring confidentiality of the policy.
We are especially interested in censors that can be realised
by off-the-shelf reasoning infrastructure. To fullfil this re-
quirement, we introduce in Section 4 view and obstruction
censors. View censors return only answers that follow from
the ontology and an anonymised dataset (a view) where some
occurrences of constants may have been replaced with la-
belled nulls. The censor answers faithfully all queries against
the view; thus, any information not captured by the view is
inaccessible by default. View censors may require material-
isation of implicit data, and hence are well-suited for appli-
cations where materialisation is feasible. Obstruction censors
are defined by a set of “forbidden query patterns” (an obstruc-
tion), where all answers instantiating such patterns are not
returned to users. These censors do not require data modifi-
cation and are well-suited for applications such as Ontology
Based Data Access (OBDA), where data is managed by an
RDBMS. Obstruction censors are dual to view censors in the
sense that they specify the information that users are denied
access to. We formally characterise this duality, and show
that their capabilities are incomparable.
In Section 5 we investigate the limitations of view censors
and show that checking existence of an optimal view is un-
decidable for Datalog ontologies. We then study fragments
of Datalog for which optimal views always exist and extend
our results to OWL 2 profile ontologies. In Section 6 we fo-
cus on obstruction censors, and provide sufficient and neces-
sary conditions for an optimal censor to exist. Then, we pro-
pose a tractable algorithm for computing optimal obstruction
censors for linear Datalog ontologies and apply our results to
OWL 2 QL ontologies.
2 Preliminaries
We adopt standard notions in first order logic over function-
free finite signatures. Our focus is on ontologies, so we as-
sume signatures with predicates of arity at most two. We treat
equality ≈ as an ordinary predicate, but assume that any set
of formulae containing ≈ also contains all the axioms of ≈
for its signature.
Datasets and Ontologies A dataset is a finite set of facts
(i.e., ground atoms). An ontology is a finite set of rules, that
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(1) A(x)∧R(x, y1)∧B(y1)∧R(x, y2)∧B(y2)→ y1 ≈ y2,
(2) R(x, y)→ S(x, y), (3) A(x)→ ∃y.[R(x, y)∧B(y)],
(4) A(x)→ x ≈ a, (5) R(x, y)∧S(y, z)→ T (x, z),
(6) A(x)∧B(x)→ C(x), (7) A(x) ∧R(x, y)→ B(y),
(8) R(x, y)→ S(y, x), (9) R(x, a)→ B(x),
(10) R(x, y)→ A(y), (11) A(x)→ R(x, a),
(12) A(x)→ B(x), (13) R(x, y) ∧B(y)→ A(x).
Table 1: OWL 2 profile axioms as rules
is, formulae of the form
ϕ(~x)→ ∃~y.ψ(~x, ~y),
where the body ϕ(~x) and the head ψ(~x, ~y) are conjunctions
of atoms, and variables ~x are implicitly universally quantified.
We restrict ourselves to ontologiesO and datasetsD such that
O∪D is satisfiable, which ensures that answers to queries are
meaningful. A rule is
– Datalog if the head has a single atom and ~y is empty;
– guarded if the body has an atom (guard) with all ~x;
– linear if the body has a single atom;
– multi-linear if the body contains only guards;
– tree-shaped if the undirected multigraph with an edge
{t1, t2} for each binary body atom R(t1, t2) is a tree.
An ontology is of a type above if so are all the rules in it.
OWL 2 Profiles Table 1 provides the types of rules sufficient
to capture the axioms in the OWL 2 RL, EL, and QL profiles.
We treat the > concept in DLs as a unary predicate and as-
sume that each ontology contains the rule S(~x) → >(x) for
each predicate S and variable x from ~x. An ontology consist-
ing of rules in Table 1 is
– RL if it has no rules of type (3);
– QL if it only has rules of types (2), (3), (8), (10), (12);
– EL if it has no rules of types (1), (7), (8).
Queries A conjunctive query (CQ) with free variables ~x is a
formula Q(~x) of the form ∃~y.ϕ(~x, ~y), with the body ϕ(~x, ~y)
a conjunction of atoms. A union of CQs (UCQ) is disjunction
of CQs with same free variables. Queries with no free vari-
ables are Boolean. A tuple of constants~a is a (certain) answer
to Q(~x) over ontology O and dataset D if O ∪D |= Q(~a).
The set of answers to Q(~x) over O and D is denoted by
cert(Q,O,D).
3 Basic Framework
We assume that data D is hidden while the ontology O is
known to all users. It is assumed that system administrators
are in charge of specifying policies as CQs, and that policies
are assigned to users by standard mechanisms such as role-
based access control [Sandhu et al., 1996].
Definition 1. A CQE instance I is a triple (O,D, P ), with O
an ontology,D a dataset, and P a CQ, which is called policy.
The instance I is Datalog, guarded, etc. if so is the ontology
O∪{ϕ(~x, ~y)→ Ap(~x)}, where ϕ(~x, ~y) is the body of P and
Ap a fresh predicate.
Example 2. Consider the following ontology and dataset that
describe an excerpt of a social network:
Oex = {Likes(x, y) ∧ Thr(y)→ ThrFan(x),
Susp(x)∧Cr(x)→ Thr(x),FoF (x,y)→ FoF (y,x)},
Dex ={FoF (John,Bob),FoF (Bob,Mary),Cr(Seven),
Likes(John,Seven),Likes(Bob,Seven),Susp(Seven)}.
Here, the ontology Oex states, for example, that people who
like thrillers are thriller fans, or that friendship is a symmetric
relation. Then, a policy Pex = FoF (John, x) forbids access
to John’s friend list. ♦
A key component of a CQE system is the censor, whose
goal is to decide according to the policy which query answers
can be safely returned to users.
Definition 3. A censor for a CQE instance (O,D, P )
is a function cens mapping each CQ Q to a subset of
cert(Q,O,D). The theory Thcens of cens is the set
{Q(~a) | ~a ∈ cens(Q) and Q(~x) is a CQ}.
Censor cens is confidentiality preserving if for each tuple ~a
of constants O ∪ Thcens 6|= P (~a). It is optimal if
– it is confidentiality preserving, and
– no confidentiality preserving censor cens′ 6= cens exists
such that cens(Q) ⊆ cens′(Q) for every CQ Q.
Intuitively, Thcens represents all the information that a user
can gather by asking CQs to the system. If the censor is con-
fidentiality preserving, then no information can be obtained
about the policy, regardless of the number of CQs asked. In
this way, optimal censors maximise information accessibility
without compromising the policy.
4 View and Obstruction Censors
The idea behind view censors is to modify the dataset by
anonymising occurrences of constants as well as by adding or
removing facts, whenever needed. We refer to such modified
dataset as an (anonymisation) view. The censor returns only
the answers that follow from the ontology and view; in this
way, the main workload of the censor amounts to the compu-
tation of certain answers, which can be delegated to the query
answering engine.
Definition 4. A view V for I = (O,D, P ) is a dataset over
the signature of I extended with a set of fresh constants. The
view censor vcensVI is the function mapping each CQ Q(~x)
to the set cert(Q,O,D)∩ cert(Q,O,V). The view is optimal
if so is its corresponding censor.
Clearly, for the censor to be confidentiality preservingO∪
V must not entail any answer to the policy. On the other hand,
to ensure optimality a view must encode as much information
from the hidden dataset as possible.
Example 5. Consider the view Vex obtained from Dex by re-
placing Bob with a fresh anb. Intuitively, Vex is the result of
“anonymising” the constant Bob, while keeping the structure
of the data intact. Since Vex contains no information about
Bob, we have cert(Pex,Oex,Vex) = ∅ and the censor based
on Vex is confidentiality preserving. View Vex, however, is
not optimal: for instance, Oex ∪ Vex does not entail the fact
Likes(Bob,Seven), which can be added to the view without
violating confidentiality. ♦
The idea behind obstruction censors is to associate to a
CQE instance a Boolean UCQ U s.t. the censor returns an
answer ~a to a CQ Q(~x) only if no CQ in U follows from
Q(~a). Thus, the obstruction can be seen as a set of forbidden
query patterns, which should not be disclosed.
Definition 6. An obstruction U for I = (O,D, P ) is a
Boolean UCQ. The obstruction censor ocensUI based on U
is the function that maps each CQ Q(~x) to the set
{~a | ~a ∈ cert(Q,O,D) and Q(~a) 6|= U}.
The obstruction is optimal if so is its censor ocensUI .
Similarly to view censors, obstruction censors do not re-
quire dedicated algorithms: checking Q(~a) |= U can be del-
egated to an RDBMS. Obstructions can be virtually main-
tained and do not require data materialisation.
Example 7. The censor based on Vex from Example 5 can
also be realised with the following obstruction Uex:
∃x.FoF (x,Bob) ∨ ∃x.FoF (Bob, x) ∨
∃x.Likes(Bob, x) ∨ ThrFan(Bob).
Intuitively, Uex “blocks” query answers involving Bob; and
all other answers are the same as over Oex ∪ Dex. ♦
Examples 5 and 7 show that the same censor may be based
on both a view and an obstruction. These censors, however,
behave dually: a view explicitly encodes the information ac-
cessible to users, whereas obstructions specify information
which users are denied access to. It is not obvious whether
(and how) a view can be realised by an obstruction, or vice-
versa. We next focus on Datalog ontologies and characterise
when a view V and obstruction U yield the same censor. We
start with few definitions.
Each Datalog ontology O and dataset D have a unique
least Herbrand model HO,D: a finite structure satisfying
~a ∈ cert(Q,O,D) iff HO,D |= Q(~a) for every CQ Q. Thus,
this model captures all the information relevant to CQ an-
swering. A natural specification of the duality between views
and obstructions is then as follows: U and V implement the
same censor if and only ifU captures the structures not homo-
morphically embeddable into HO,V . To formalise this state-
ment, we recall the central problem in the (non-uniform) con-
straint satisfaction theory.
Definition 8 (Kolaitis and Vardi, 2008). Let C be a class of
finite structures and let C′ be a subset of C. First-order sen-
tence ψ defines C′ if I ∈ C′ is equivalent to I |= ψ for every
structure I ∈ C.
Let J ↪→ J ′ denote the fact that there is a homomorphism
from a structure J to a structure J ′. The correspondence is
given in the following theorem.
Theorem 9. Let I = (O,D, P ) be Datalog and C = {I |
I finite, I ↪→ HO,D}. Then, vcensVI = ocensUI iff U defines
the set C \ {I ∈ C | I ↪→ HO,V}.
Using this theorem together with definability results in Fi-
nite Model Theory, we can show that views and obstructions
cannot simulate one another in general.
Theorem 10. There is a Datalog CQE instance admitting
a confidentiality preserving view censor that is not based on
any obstruction. Conversely, there is a Datalog CQE instance
admitting a confidentiality preserving obstruction censor that
is not based on any view.
5 Optimal View Censors
Our discussion in Section 4 suggests that view and obstruc-
tion censors must be studied independently. In this section we
focus on view censors and start by establishing their theoret-
ical limitations. The following example shows that optimal
view censors may not exist, even if we restrict ourselves to
empty ontologies.
Example 11. Consider a CQE instance with empty ontol-
ogy, dataset consisting of a fact R(a, a), and policy P =
∃x∃y ∃z.R(x, y) ∧ R(y, z) ∧ R(z, x). Consider also the
family of Boolean CQs Qn = ∃x1 . . . ∃xn.
∧
i<j R(xi, xj),
which intuitively represent strict total orders on n ele-
ments. Answering these queries positively is harmless: V ∪
{Qn}n≥1 6|= P for any confidentiality preserving view V .
Assume now that V is optimal, and let m be the number of
constants in V . Then, V 6|= Qm+1 since otherwise V would
encode a self-loop and violate the policy. This contradicts the
optimality of V , and hence no optimal view exists. ♦
Furthermore, determining the existence of an optimal view
is undecidable even for Datalog CQE instances.
Theorem 12. The problem of checking whether a Datalog
CQE instance admits an optimal view is undecidable.
Proof (idea). The proof is by reduction to the undecidable
problem of checking whether a deterministic Turing machine
without a final state has a repeated configuration in a run on
the empty tape. For each such machine we construct a CQE
instance such that the run corresponds to an infinite grid-like
“view” with axes for the tape and time. The ontology guar-
antees that representations of adjacent configurations agree
with the transition function, and the policy forbids invalid
configurations (e.g., with many symbols in a cell). Coin-
ciding configurations appear in the run iff the grid can be
“folded” to a finite view on all sides (e.g., if configurations
can be merged).
In what follows, we identify classes of CQE instances that
guarantee existence of optimal view censors. We start by
studying restrictions on Datalog ontologies and then adapt the
obtained results to the OWL 2 profiles.
5.1 Guarded Tree-Shaped Datalog
The idea behind view censors is to anonymise information in
the original data in such a way that the policy cannot be vi-
olated. For instance, in Example 5 we substituted the atom
FoF (John,Bob) with FoF (John, anb), where anb is a fresh
constant that is an anonymised copy of Bob. In general, how-
ever, many such anonymous copies may be required for each
data constant to encode all the information required for ensur-
ing optimality. The limit case is illustrated by Example 11,
where no finite number of fresh constants suffices for opti-
mality.
John
Bob
John{MovFan} John{MovFan,ThrFan}
Bob{MovFan,ThrFan}· · ·
Figure 1: Part of optimal view in Example 13 (omitted labels
coincide to subscipts, arrows represent FoF )
Observe that the CQE instance used in Example 11 is nei-
ther guarded nor tree-shaped due to the form of the policy.
In what follows, we show that an optimal view can always
be constructed using at most exponentially many anonymous
constants if we restrict ourselves to Datalog CQE instances
that are guarded and tree-shaped.
We next provide an intuitive idea of the construction. Con-
sider the view for a CQE instance (O,D, P ) consisting of the
following three components V1–V3.
(1) Component V1 is any maximal set of unary atoms in
HO,D that does not compromise the policy.
(2) To construct V2, we consider an anonymised copy aB of
each constant a and each set B of unary predicates B s.t.
HO,D |= B(a). The corresponding set of all unary atoms
B(aB) forB ∈ B is a part of V2 if and only if it is “safe”,
that is, neither discloses the policy nor entail new facts
together with O ∪ V1.
(3) Finally, V3 consists of a maximal set of binary atoms on
all the constants (including the copies) that are justified
byHO,D and do not disclose the policy.
Optimality of this view follows immediately from the con-
struction. The view, however, may require exponentially
many anonymised copies of data constants. The need for
them is illustrated by the following example.
Example 13. Consider the CQE instance with ontol-
ogy consisting of rules ThrFan(x)→MovFan(x) and
ThrFan(y)∧FoF (x, y) → MovFan(x), dataset con-
sisting of facts FoF (John,Bob), ThrFan(John) and
ThrFan(Bob), and policy MovFan(x). The essential part
of the optimal view obtained using the aforementioned con-
struction is given in Figure 1. Here V1 = ∅, V2 contains
unary atoms over the anonymised copies John{MovFan} and
John{MovFan,ThrFan} of John, and Bob{MovFan,ThrFan} of
Bob, while V3 contains the FoF atoms represented by ar-
rows. Note that at least two anonymised copies of John are
necessary in any optimal view to answer correctly “harmless”
queries such as
∃x∃y ∃z.ThrFan(x) ∧ FoF (x, y) ∧ ThrFan(y) ∧
FoF (z, y) ∧MovFan(z) ∧ FoF (z,Bob). ♦
This example shows that, in order to avoid the exponen-
tial blow up in the number of anonymised copies, we need
further restrictions on the ontology. In particular, in the case
of multi-linear CQE instances we can guarantee that just one
copy suffices for every constant.
The following theorem formalises the intuition above.
Theorem 14. Let I be a Datalog tree-shaped CQE instance.
If I is guarded, it admits an optimal view that can be com-
puted in time exponential in |I| and polynomial in data size.
If I is multi-linear, it admits an optimal view that can be com-
puted in time polynomial in |I|. Additionally, I has a unique
optimal censor if it is linear.
5.2 OWL 2 Profiles
The result in Theorem 14 is immediately applicable to RL
ontologies, with the only restriction that they do not contain
rules of types (1), (4), or (5) in Table 1. In contrast to RL,
the QL and EL profiles provide means for capturing exis-
tentially quantified knowledge. To bridge this gap, we show
that every (guarded) QL or EL CQE instance I = (O,D, P )
can be polynomially trasformed into a Datalog CQE instance
I′ = (O′,D, P ) by rewriting O into a (guarded and tree-
shaped) Datalog ontology O′ in such a way that optimal
views for I can be directly obtained from those for I′. We
start by specifying what constitutes an acceptable rewriting
O′ of O.
Definition 15. Let σ be a set of constants.A Datalog ontol-
ogy O′ is a σ-rewriting of an ontology O if cert(Q,O,D) =
cert(Q,O′,D) for each tree-shaped CQ Q and dataset D
over constants from σ.
The following proposition provides the mechanism to re-
duce optimal view computation for arbitrary ontologies to the
case of Datalog.
Proposition 16. Let I = (O,D, P ) be a CQE instance over
constants σ with P tree-shaped, and O′ a σ-rewriting of O
s.t. O′ |= O. If V ′ is an optimal view for I′ = (O′,D, P ),
thenHO′,V′ is an optimal view for I.
With this proposition at hand, we just need to devise a tech-
nique for rewriting any QL (or guarded EL) ontology into
a stronger Datalog ontology, which, however, preserves the
answers to all tree-shaped queries. To this end, we exploit
techniques developed for the so-called combined approach to
query answering [Kontchakov et al., 2011; Lutz et al., 2009;
Lutz et al., 2013; Stefanoni et al., 2013]. The idea is to trans-
form rules of type (3) into Datalog by Skolemising existen-
tially quantified variables into globally fresh constants. Such
transformation strengthens the ontology; however, if applied
to a QL or guarded EL ontology, it preserves answers to tree-
shaped CQs for any dataset over σ [Stefanoni et al., 2013].
Definition 17. Let O be an ontology and σ be a set of con-
stants. The ontology Ξσ(O) is obtained from O by replacing
each rule A(x)→ ∃y.[R(x, y) ∧B(y)] with
A(x)→R′(x, a), R′(x, y)→R(x, y), R′(x, y)→B(y),
where R′ is a fresh binary predicate, uniquely associated to
the original rule, and a is a globally fresh constant not from
σ, uniquely associated to A and R.
Theorem 18. For any ontology O we have Ξσ(O) |= O.
Furthermore, if O is either a QL or guarded EL ontology,
then Ξσ(O) is a σ-rewriting of O.
Proposition 16 and Theorem 18 ensure that HΞσ(O),V is
an optimal view for I whenever V is such a view for I′ =
(Ξσ(O),D, P ). The transformation ofO to Ξσ(O) preserves
linearity, guardedness, and tree-shapedness, so the results of
Section 5.1 are applicable to I′.
Theorem 19. Every guarded EL CQE instance admits an op-
timal view that can be computed in exponential time. Every
QL instance admits a unique optimal censor, which is imple-
mentable by a view of polynomial size.
6 Optimal Obstruction Censors
Similarly to Section 5, we start the study of optimal ob-
struction censors with its limitations. The following exam-
ple shows that such a censor may not exist even if we restrict
ourselves to ontologies with only one rule.
Example 20. Consider a CQE instance with ontology
{R(x, y)∧A(y)→ A(x)}, dataset {R(a, a), A(a)}, and pol-
icy A(a). Let Qn, n > 0, be a family of Boolean CQs
∃~x.R(a, x1) ∧R(x1, x2) ∧· · ·∧R(xn−1, xn) ∧A(xn).
With the help of the ontology each of Qn discloses the pol-
icy. Thus, eachQn should entail a Boolean CQ in any optimal
obstruction. Consider the set of all CQs that are entailed by
queries Qn but not equivalent to any of them. On the one
hand, this set is “harmless”, than is, any obstruction censor
should answer all these queries positively. On the other hand,
the CQs Qn do not entail each other. Hence, any optimal ob-
struction should contain a CQ equivalent to each Qn, which
is however not possible, because n is unbounded. ♦
We leave the question of decidability of checking the ex-
istence of an optimal obstruction for a CQE instance open.
Answering this question positively would imply a solution
to a long-standing open problem. In Appendix C we pro-
vide a reduction from the problem of uniform bounded-
ness for binary Datalog, for which the decidability is un-
known [Marcinkowski, 1999], to the existence problem of
optimal obstructions for Datalog CQE instances. In the rest
of the section we give a characterisation of optimal obstruc-
tions for Datalog instances in terms of resolution proofs and
identify restrictions for which the characterisation guarantees
existence of such obstructions.
6.1 Characterisation of Optimal Obstructions
We first recall the standard notion of SLD resolution.
A goal is a conjunction of atoms. An SLD resolution step
takes a goal β ∧ ϕ with a selected atom β and a sentence r
that is either a Datalog rule ψ → δ or a fact δ, and produces
a new goal ϕθ ∧ ψθ, where θ is a most general unifier of β
and δ (assuming that ψ is empty in the case when r is a fact).
An (SLD) proof of a goal G0 in a Datalog ontology O and
dataset D is a sequence of goals G0, G1, . . . , Gn, where Gn
is empty, and each Gi is obtained from Gi−1 and a sentence
(rule or fact) in O ∪D by an SLD resolution step.
Resolution is sound and complete: for any Datalog ontol-
ogy O, dataset D, and goal G (such that O ∪D is satisfiable)
there is a proof of G inO and D if and only ifO∪D |= ∃∗G
for the existential closure ∃∗G of G.
We next characterise optimal obstructions using SLD
proofs. Intuitively, if an obstruction censor answers posi-
tively sufficient number of Boolean CQs ∃∗G for goals G
in a proof of a policy, then a user could reconstruct (a part
of) this proof and compromise the policy. Also, there can
be many proofs, and a user may compromise the policy by
reconstructing any of them. Thus, to ensure that a censor
is confidentiality preserving, we must guarantee that the ob-
struction contains enough CQs to prevent reconstruction of
any proof. If we also want the censor to be optimal, the ob-
struction should not block too many CQs. As we will see later
on, these requirements may be in conflict and lead to an infi-
nite “obstruction”. Next definitions formalise this intuition.
Definition 21. Let I = (O,D, P ) be a Datalog CQE in-
stance, Q be the set of all Boolean CQs ∃∗G for goals G
in proofs of P (~a) in O and D for some tuple of constants ~a,
and S be a maximal subset of Q such that O ∪ S 6|= P (~a) for
any ~a. Then, a pseudo-obstruction for I is a subset of Q \ S
that contains a CQ Q′ for any Q in Q \ S with Q |= Q′.
The next theorem establishes the connection between
pseudo-obstructions and optimality.
Theorem 22. Let I be a Datalog CQE instance.
1. If Υ is a finite pseudo-obstruction for I, then
∨
Q∈ΥQ is
an optimal obstruction for I.
2. If each pseudo-obstruction for I is infinite, then no optimal
obstruction censor for I exists.
This theorem has implications on the expressive power of
obstructions. In particular, we can now extend the result in
Theorem 10, which applies to censors that are not necessarily
optimal, to capture also optimality.
Theorem 23. There is a CQE instance, which is both RL and
EL, admitting an optimal view, but no optimal obstruction.
Conversely, there exists an RL CQE instance that admits an
optimal obstruction, but no optimal view.
6.2 Linear Datalog and QL
We now show how to apply resolution-based techniques to
compute optimal obstructions for linear Datalog CQE in-
stances and then adapt the results to QL. In fact, we can
guarantee not only existence of optimal obstructions for such
instances, but also uniqueness and polynomiality of corre-
sponding censors.
Our solution for linear Datalog instances is based on the
computation of the set Q of existential closures of goals in
the proofs of policies. However, since all the rules in the on-
tology are linear and the body of the policy is an atom (recall
that the rule corresponding to the policy should be linear as
well), each of these goals consists of a single atom, except
the last goal in each proof, which is empty. There are only
polynomial number of such atoms (up to renaming of vari-
ables). So, all the proofs can be represented by a single finite
proof graph with atoms and the empty conjunction (denoted
by >) as nodes, and SLD resolution steps as edges. This is
illustrated by the following example.
Example 24. Consider a CQE instance with ontology
{Likes(x, y)→Movie(y),Likes(x, y)→MovFan(x)},
dataset Likes(John,Seven), and policy MovFan(John). A
fragment of the proof graph is given in Figure 2. ♦
Using proof graphs we can compute optimal censors.
Theorem 25. Let I = (O,D, P ) be a linear Datalog CQE
instance, and let S be the set of all nodes in the proof graph of
Likes(x, y)
Likes(John, y)
Likes(John, Seven)
Likes(x, Seven)
Movie(Seven)
Movie(y)
MovFan(x)MovFan(John)
>
Figure 2: Fragment of proof graph from Example 24
O∪D on the paths from facts P (~a) with any tuple of constants
~a to >. Then, the Boolean UCQ
U =
∨
G∈S\{>} ∃
∗G
is an optimal obstruction computable in polynomial time, and
ocensUI is the unique optimal censor for I.
Example 26. For the instance in Example 24 there is
only one path in the proof graph from the policy to >,
and S = {MovFan(John),Likes(John, y),>}. Thus,
movieFan(John) ∨ ∃y.Likes(John, y) is optimal. ♦
Finally, note that the transformation of a QL ontology O
to an RL ontology Ξσ(O) given in Definition 17, preserves
linearity of rules. Hence, Proposition 18 with Theorem 25
yield the following result.
Theorem 27. Every QL CQE instance admits a unique opti-
mal censor based on an obstruction that can be computed in
polynomial time.
7 Related Work
The formal study of privacy in databases has received signif-
icant attention. CQE for propositional databases with com-
plete information has been studied in [Sicherman et al., 1983;
Bonatti et al., 1995; Biskup and Bonatti, 2001; Biskup and
Bonatti, 2004]. CQE was extended to (propositional) in-
complete databases in [Biskup and Weibert, 2008]. Mik-
lau and Suciu (2007) studied perfect privacy. Perfect pri-
vacy, however, is very strict and may preclude publishing
of any meaningful information when extended to ontolo-
gies [Cuenca Grau and Horrocks, 2008]. View-based au-
thorisation was investigated in [Rizvi et al., 2004; Zhang
and Mendelzon, 2005], and Deutsch and Papakonstantinou
(2005) analysed the implications to privacy derived from pub-
lishing database views.
Privacy in the context of ontologies is a growing area of
research. Information hiding at the schema level was studied
in [Konev et al., 2009; Cuenca Grau and Motik, 2012]. Data
privacy for EL and ALC DLs was investigated in [Stouppa
and Studer, 2007; Tao et al., 2010], and the notion of a
privacy-preserving reasoner was introduced in [Bao et al.,
2007]. Calvanese et al. (2012) extended the view-based au-
thorisation framework by Zhang and Mendelzon (2005) to
DL ontologies.
An early work on non-propositional CQE is [Biskup
and Bonatti, 2007]. CQE for ontologies has been stud-
ied in [Cuenca Grau et al., 2013; Bonatti and Sauro, 2013;
Studer and Werner, 2014]. We extend Cuenca Grau et al.
(2013) with a wide range of new results: (i) we consider arbi-
trary CQs as policies rather than just ground facts; (ii) we in-
troduce obstruction censors, compare their expressive power
with that of view censors, characterise their optimality, and
show how to compute obstructions for linear Datalog and
QL ontologies; (iii) we show undecidability of checking ex-
istence of an optimal view censor and provide algorithms
for guarded Datalog and all the OWL 2 profiles. We see
our work as complementary to Bonatti and Sauro (2013)
and Studer and Werner (2014). The former focuses on sit-
uations where attackers have access to external sources of
background knowledge; they identify additional vulnerabil-
ities and propose solutions within the CQE framework. The
latter focuses on meta-properties of general censors that, in
contrast to ours, can also provide unsound answers or refuse
queries.
8 Conclusions
We studied CQE in the context of ontologies. Our results pro-
vide insights on the fundamental tradeoff between accessibil-
ity and confidentiality of information. Moreover, they yield
a flexible way for system designers to ensure selective access
to data. In particular, we proposed tractable view based solu-
tions for CQE instances with tree-shaped and linear Datalog
and QL ontologies, and tractable obstruction based solutions
for linear Datalog and QL ontologies. Our solutions can be
implemented using off-the-shelf query answering infrastruc-
ture and provide a starting point for CQE system develop-
ment.
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A Appendix (Proofs)
A.1 Proofs for Section 4
Before proving Theorem 9 we present the following notation and a lemma. Let I be a finite structure and f a function
associating a fresh variable to each domain element of I. The query QI for I is the Boolean CQ defined as follows, with
R1, . . . Rn the predicates interpreted by I:
QI = ∃∗
∧
1≤i≤n
{Ri(f(u1), . . . , f(umi)) | (u1, . . . , umi) ∈ RIi }.
Given a BCQ Q, denote [Q] the structure interpreting each R, occurring in Q, with (f(u1), . . . f(un)) for every atom
R(u1, . . . , un) in Q, where f maps each constant in Q to itself and each variable y to a fresh constant dy .
Lemma 28. Let J be a finite structure and let C be a class of finite structures. Then, the following holds:
{I ∈ C | I 6↪→ J} = {I ∈ C | I |=
∨
K∈C,K6↪→J
QK}.
Proof. Let I ∈ C be such that I 6↪→ J ; clearly, I |= QI and hence I |= ∨K∈C,K6↪→J QK, as required. Conversely, assume
that I ∈ C is such that I |= ∨K∈C,K6↪→J QK; then, there exists K such that K ∈ C, K 6↪→ J and I |= QK. The latter implies
that K ↪→ I and hence we can deduce I 6↪→ J , as required (otherwise, we would have by composition of homomorphisms that
K ↪→ J , which is a contradiction).
Theorem 9. Let I = (O,D, P ) be Datalog and C = {I | I finite, I ↪→ HO,D}. Then, vcensVI = ocensUI iff U defines the set
C \ {I ∈ C | I ↪→ HO,V}.
Proof.
(⇐) Assume that U defines C \ {I ∈ C | I ↪→ HO,V}, which is equal to {I ∈ C | I 6↪→ HO,V}. Then, for each I ∈ C we
have that I 6↪→ HO,V iff I |= U . By Lemma 28, the following holds for each I ∈ C:
I |= U iff I |=
∨
K∈C,K6↪→HO,V
QK. (1)
Let Q(~x) be a CQ, and let ~t ∈ cert(Q,O,D), which implies that [Q(~t)] ↪→ HO,D and hence [Q(~t)] ∈ C. We show that
~t ∈ vcensVI (Q) iff ~t ∈ ocensUI (Q).
For the forward direction, assume that~t ∈ vcensVI (Q); then,O∪V |= Q(~t) and hence [Q(~t)] ↪→ HO,V . We can then conclude
[Q(~t)] 6|= ∨K∈C,K6↪→HO,V QK (otherwise, K ↪→ [Q(~t)] for some QK in U and since we have established that [Q(~t)] ↪→ HO,V
and homomorphism compose we would have K ↪→ HO,V which is a contradiction). But then, Equation (1) implies that
[Q(~t)] 6|= U and by the definition of obstruction-censor that ~t ∈ ocensUI (Q), as required.
For the backward direction, assume now that ~t ∈ ocensUI (Q). Then, by the definition of obstruction censor we have [Q(~t)] 6|=
U . By Equation (1) we then have [Q(~t)] 6|= ∨K∈C,K6↪→HO,V QK. Lemma 28 immediately implies that [Q(~t)] 6∈ {I ∈ C | I 6↪→
HO,V}. From this, we must conclude that [Q(~t)] ∈ {I ∈ C | I ↪→ HO,V} and hence [Q(~t)] ↪→ HO,V , which implies
O ∪ V |= Q(~t) and ~t ∈ vcensVI (Q), as required.
(⇒) Assume that ocensUI = vcensVI . To show that U defines {I ∈ C | I 6↪→ HO,V}, we prove that I |= U iff I 6↪→ HO,V for
every structure I in C. If I ↪→ HO,D and I |= U , then ocensUI (QI) = False. Since ocensUI = vcensVI , we also have that
vcensVI (Q
I) = False and hence O ∪ V 6|= QI . Consequently, I 6↪→ HO,V , as required. If I 6↪→ HO,V , then O ∪ V 6|= QI ;
consequently, vcensVI (Q
I) = False. Since ocensUI = vcens
V
I , we have ocens
U
I (Q
I) = False and hence, since I ↪→ HO,D,
we necessarily have I |= U .
Theorem 10. There is a Datalog CQE instance admitting a confidentiality preserving view censor that is not based on any
obstruction. Conversely, there is a Datalog CQE instance admitting a confidentiality preserving obstruction censor that is not
based on any view.
Proof. First we illustrate that obstruction censors cannot always simulate view censors. Consider CQE instance I = (∅,D, ∅),
where D represents an undirected graph with nodes “green” g and “blue” b, which are connected by edge in all possible ways:
D = {edge(g, b), edge(b, g), edge(b, b), edge(g, g)}.
Clearly, D entails every Boolean CQ over the edge relation and thus every graph can be homomorphically embedded into D.
Consider V = {edge(g, b), edge(b, g)}. Since the ontology is empty,H∅,V = V and {I | I is finite, I ↪→ HO,D, and I 6↪→ V}
is the class of all graphs that are not 2-colourable. It is well-known that this class of graphs is not first-order definable and hence
cannot be captured by a UCQ.
Next we construct an obstruction censor which cannot be simulated by a view censor. Consider the instance I = (O,D, ∅),
where D = {edge(a, a)} and O consists of the single transitivity rule
edge(x, y) ∧ edge(y, z)→ edge(x, z).
Clearly, O ∪ D entails each Boolean CQ over the edge relation. Consider obstruction U = ∃y.edge(y, y), which defines the
class of directed graphs with self loops. Suppose that some view V realises ocensUI . By Theorem 9, the obstruction U must
define {I ∈ C | I 6↪→ HO,V} where C is the class of all directed graphs. Thus, any graph G must satisfy the property
G has no self loops iff G ↪→ HO,V .
Due to the rule in O, we conclude that V is a DAG, that is, it has no edge-loops. Take a DAG G extending (a graph isomorphic
to) HO,V with a new node v and edges connecting all its sink nodes to v. Clearly G has no self loops, but G 6↪→ HO,V , which
is a contradiction.
A.2 Proofs for Section 5
Theorem 12. The problem of checking whether a Datalog CQE instance admits an optimal view is undecidable.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from the following problem: does a deterministic Turing machine without a final state have a
repeated configuration? This problem is undecidable by Rice’s Theorem.
Formally, for every such Turing machine M = (Γ,Q, q0, δ) with Γ a tape alphabet, which include the blank symbol 0, Q a
set of states, q0 ∈ Q an initial state, and δ : Γ×Q → Γ× (Q \ {q0})× {+,−} a transition function, we construct an Datalog
CQE instance IM = (O,D, P ) such that it admits an optimal view if and only if M starting on the empty tape has a repeated
configuration. The notion of configuration is as usual—it is the content of the tape and the head pointer to a cell on the tape.
Note that the transition function δ is defined is such a way that the initial state does not appear in a computation anywhere
except the initial configuration. This clearly does not affect the undecidability of the problem. We also assume, that the tape of
the machine is infinite in both directions, and all of it can freely be used for computations.
We start the construction of IM from the dataset D. It uses only one constant a and consists of three binary atoms
R(a, a), S(a, a), T (a, a).
The predicate T is intended to point to the next cell on the tape, the predicate S points to the same cell in the following
configuration, and the predicateR is responsible for initialisation. We start the definition of the ontologyO with the description
of the role of R. Let O contain rules
R(x, x)→ I(x), (2)
R(x, y) ∧R(y, z)→ R(x, z), (3)
R(x, y) ∧ I(y)→ I(x). (4)
As we will see formally later, these rules guarantee that if IM admits an optimal view, then this view contains the fact I(a).
This fact initialises the tape by means of the following rules (conjunction in heads is just a syntactic sugar):
I(x)→ I+(x) ∧ I−(x) ∧ Cq0(x) ∧A0(x), (5)
I+(x) ∧ T (x, y)→ I+(y) ∧ C∅(y) ∧A0(y), (6)
I−(y) ∧ T (x, y)→ I−(x) ∧ C∅(x) ∧A0(x). (7)
In these rules Cq0 is a unary predicate indicating that the head is pointing to the first cell and the state is q0. For each other state
q in Q the vocabulary contains the corresponding predicate Cq . The rest of the tape should always be marked by predicates
C∅ indicating that the head does not point to this cell. Similarly, if in some configuration a cell contains an alphabet symbol
g ∈ Γ, then this is indicated by the predicate Ag; for example, the rules above ensure that the tape is initialised by the symbol
0. To ensure the consistency of the computation grid, constructed by means of tape and time predicates T and S, the ontology
contains the rules
T (x, y) ∧ T (z, u) ∧ S(y, u)→ S(x, z), (8)
T (x, y) ∧ T (z, u) ∧ S(x, z)→ S(y, u). (9)
Finally, we need to make the adjacent configurations consistent. In particular, the content of each cell, as well as the fact that
the head is pointing to this cell in some particular state, that is, the cell’s Cq and Ag labels, is completely defined by the labels
of the three cells in the previous configuration. So, abbreviating T (x, y) ∧ T (y, z) ∧ S(y, u) ∧ Ag−(x) ∧ Ag(y) ∧ Ag+(z) by
ϕ(x, y, z, u), the ontology O contains the rules
ϕ(x, y, z, u)∧C∅(x)∧Cq(y)∧C∅(z)→ C∅(u)∧Ag′(u), for all g−, g+ ∈ Γ, if δ(g, q) = (g′, q′, d) for some q′, d,
ϕ(x, y, z, u)∧Cq(x)∧C∅(y)∧C∅(z)→ C∅(u)∧Ag(u), for all g, g+ ∈ Γ, if δ(g−, q) = (g′, q′,−) for some g′, q′,
ϕ(x, y, z, u)∧C∅(x)∧C∅(y)∧Cq(z)→ C∅(u)∧Ag(u), for all g, g− ∈ Γ, if δ(g+, q) = (g′, q′,+) for some g′, q′,
ϕ(x, y, z, u)∧Cq(x)∧C∅(y)∧C∅(z)→ Cq′(u)∧Ag(u), for all g, g+ ∈ Γ, if δ(g−, q) = (g′, q′,+) for some g′,
ϕ(x, y, z, u)∧C∅(x)∧C∅(y)∧Cq(z)→ Cq′(u)∧Ag(u), for all g, g− ∈ Γ, if δ(g+, q) = (g′, q′,−) for some g′,
ϕ(x, y, z, u)∧C∅(x)∧C∅(y)∧C∅(z)→ C∅(u)∧Ag(u), for all g−, g, g+ ∈ Γ.
Having the ontology defined, we complete the construction with specifying the policy. It consists of several BCQs, but the
translation to a single CQ by means of several rules in the ontology is straightforward. The policy P guarantees that a cell
cannot contain several alphabet symbols, the machine cannot be in several states, and the head cannot simultaneously point and
not point to a cell. This is formalised as the following set of BCQs:
∃x.Ag(x) ∧Ag′(x), for all g, g′ ∈ Γ such that g 6= g′,
∃x.Cq(x) ∧ Cq′(x), for all q, q′ ∈ Q ∪ {∅} such that q 6= q′.
Completed the construction, next we formally prove that M has a repeated configuration if and only if IM has a (finite)
optimal view. We start with forward direction.
(⇒)
Let the first pair of repeated configurations of M have numbers m and n, while the smallest (non-positive) number of a cell
whose content was changed during the computation is k + 1, and the biggest (non-negative) such number is `− 1 (we assume
that initially the head is pointing to the cell number 0). Note that k and ` are finite, because a computation cannot use infinite
number of cells in finite number of steps. In fact, k > −n and ` < n.
The view V makes use of constants aij with −1 ≤ i < n and k ≤ j ≤ `, such that a00 = a and all others are anonymous
copies of a. By means of binary predicates S and T these constants form a grid, that is the view contains atoms
S(a(i−1)j , aij), for all 0 ≤ i < n, k ≤ j ≤ `,
T (ai(j−1), aij), for all −1 ≤ i < n, k < j ≤ `.
The grid is “folded” on all the sides, in the configuration number i = −1 and cells number k and ` by means of self loops, and
on repeated configurations m and n:
S(a(−1)j , a(−1)j), for all k ≤ j ≤ `,
T (aik, aik), for all −1 ≤ i < n,
T (ai`, ai`), for all −1 ≤ i < n,
S(a(n−1)j , amj), for all k ≤ j ≤ `.
Each configuration with number 0 ≤ i < n with the word gk . . . g` written on the part of the tape with cell numbers from k to
`, the state q, and the head pointing to the cell number h is represented by means of the following facts:
Agj (aij), for all k ≤ j ≤ `,
Cq(aih),
C∅(aij), for all k ≤ j ≤ `, j 6= h.
The auxiliary “configuration” number −1 is the same as a usual configuration with the empty tape, except that the head does
not point anywhere:
A0(a(−1)j), for all k ≤ j ≤ `,
C∅(a(−1)j), for all k ≤ j ≤ `, j 6= h.
The constant a is in the initialisation predicates:
R(a, a), I(a).
Finally, each configuration with number −1 ≤ i < n (i.e., including the auxiliary one) has cells with numbers k′ and `′ such
that all the cells between k and k′, as well as all the cells between `′ and ` contain 0 and do not have the head pointing on them.
the first group is marked by I− and the second by I+:
I−(a(ij), for all k ≤ j ≤ k′,
I+(a(ij), for all `′ ≤ j ≤ `.
It is straightforward to see that V |= O and O ∪ V 6|= P , that is, V is a confidentiality preserving view for IM . Also, it is a
matter of technicality to check that the view is indeed optimal.
(⇐)
Next we show that if the machine M does not have a repeated configuration, then there is no optimal view for the instance
IM . Assume for the sake of contradiction that such a view V exists. Without loss of generality we may assume that V |= O.
The first fact we need is the following claim.
Claim 29. The view V contains the atom I(a).
Proof. Whatever is the shape of V , it entails the BCQs
QRi = ∃x1 . . . ∃xi. R(a, x1) ∧R(x1, x2) ∧ · · · ∧R(xi−1, xi) for all i ≥ 1.
Since i is unbounded, but V is finite, there exists i0 such that there is a homomorphism from the body of QRi0 to V which sends
different xj and xk to the same constant. This means that there is an R-loop of some length in V , which is connected by an
R-chain from a. By the rules (2)–(4) this implies that I(a) is a fact in V .
Similarly to the proof of the claim above, whatever is the shape of V , it entails the BCQs Whatever is the shape of V , it entails
the BCQs
QSi = ∃x1 . . . ∃xi. S(a, x1) ∧ S(x1, x2) ∧ · · · ∧ S(xi−1, xi) for all i ≥ 1.
Since V is finite, this implies that there is the (finite) biggest number n − 1 such that the body of QSn has a homomorphism toV which sends different xj to different constants.
Consider now a “grid” BCQ QS,T that consists of the following atoms:
S(x(i−1)j , xij), for all 0 < i ≤ n,−n ≤ j ≤ n,
T (xi(j−1), xij), for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n,−n < j ≤ n,
x00 = a.
This query is also “harmless”, that is, should be entailed by V whatever is its shape. Since this BCQ has a chain of S starting
from a of length greater than n − 1, for any homomorphism from the body of QS,T to V there are numbers k and ` such
that this homomorphism sends xk0 and x`0 to the same constant. Let h be such a homomorphism, and k, ` be the numbers
corresponding to h. By rules (8) and (9) we have that V contains atoms
S(x(`−1)j , xkj), for all −n ≤ j ≤ n. (10)
On the other hand, by the fact that I(a) is in V and the rules (5)–(7) we have that the constants h(x0j) for −n ≤ j ≤
n represent the part of the initial configuration on cells with numbers from −n to n. Furthermore, by means of the rules
corresponding to the transition function of the machine, the constants h(xij) form the part of the configuration with number
i for all 0 < i < `. By the same rules and atoms (10) we conclude that the constants h(xkj) represent not only the part of
the configuration number k, but also the part of the configuration number `. If these parts are different, then this discloses the
policy, so they are the same. But the rest of the configuration, that is the content of the tape beyond the cells with numbers from
−n to n, is also the same for the configurations, because they are just full of symbols 0 (the head cannot reach this part of the
tape because it is too far). So, we come to the fact that M has a repeated computation, which contradicts the precondition.
Proposition 30. The censor vcensVI based on a view V is confidentiality preserving for a CQE instance I = (O,D, P ) if and
only if O ∪ V 6|= P (~s) for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D). Additionally, it is optimal if and only if for each CQ Q(~x) and each
~t ∈ cert(Q,O,D), the fact that O ∪ V ∪ {Q(~t)} 6|= P (~s) for any ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D) implies that ~t ∈ cert(Q,O,V).
Proof. Assume thatO∪V 6|= P (~s) for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D). Trivially,O∪V |= ThvcensVI and hence we haveO∪ThvcensVI 6|=
P (~s) for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D), as required.
Assume now that cens is confidentiality preserving, in which case O ∪ ThvcensVI 6|= P (~s) for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D). Next,
assume for the sake of contradiction thatO∪V |= P (~s) for some ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D). SinceO∪D |= P (~s), by the definition of
policy we have that vcensVI (P (~s)) = True and thus P (~s) ∈ ThvcensVI ; therefore,O∪ThvcensVI |= P (~s), which is a contradiction.
We next focus on the optimality statement. Assume that O ∪ V ∪ {Q(~t)} 6|= P (~s) for any ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D) implies that
~t ∈ cert(Q,O,V), while vcensVI is not optimal. Then, there is a confidentiality preserving censor cens that extends vcensVI ; this
means that for some CQ Q(~x) and, ~t ∈ cert(Q,O,D) we have ~t ∈ cens(Q), but ~t /∈ vcensVI (Q). The fact that ~t /∈ vcensVI (Q)
and ~t ∈ cert(Q,O,D) implies that ~t 6∈ cert(Q,O,V). Furthermore, the fact that cens is confidentiality-preserving implies that
O ∪Thcens ∪ {Q(~t)} 6|= P (~s) for any ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D). But then, since cens extends vcensVI , we have that ThvcensVI ⊆ Thcens
and hence O ∪ ThvcensVI ∪ {Q(~t)} 6|= P (~s), and therefore ~t ∈ vcensVI (Q), which is a contradiction.
Finally, assume that there exists some CQ Q(~x) and ~t ∈ cert(Q,O,D) such that O ∪ V ∪ {Q(~t)} 6|= P (~s) for each
~s ∈ cert(P,O,D), but O ∪ V 6|= Q(~t). Then, we can define a censor cens that behaves exactly like vcensVI , with the exception
of answering Q(~t) positively. Thus, Thcens = ThvcensVI ∪ {Q(~t)}. But then, since O ∪ V ∪ {Q(~t)} 6|= P (~s) for each ~s ∈
cert(P,O,D) and O ∪ V |= ThvcensVI we have that O ∪ Thcens 6|= P (~s), which implies that cens is confidentiality preserving
and ThvcensVI is not optimal, as required.
We say that a rule is normalised if it has at most two atoms in its body; an ontology is normalised if it is a set of normalised
rules. Clearly, any guarded ontology can be normalised.
Definition 31. Let Σ be a signature, O an ontology over Σ, and a subset S of Σ is a set of unary predicates. S is closed under
O if (i) O ∪ {A(x) | A ∈ S} |= C(x) implies that C ∈ S and (ii) if A does not occur in O, then A ∈ S.
Theorem 14. Let I be a Datalog tree-shaped CQE instance. If I is guarded, it admits an optimal view that can be computed in
time exponential in |I| and polynomial in data size. If I is multi-linear, it admits an optimal view that can be computed in time
polynomial in |I|. Additionally, I has a unique optimal censor if it is linear.
Proof.
Guarded, tree-shaped CQE instance. Algorithm 1 presents a procedure that builds a view for a given CQE instance I =
(O,D, P ). We are going to show that if I is tree-shaped and guarded, then the algorithm returns an optimal view for I. By its
construction, the constructed dataset V is safe, so it remains to prove its optimality. Due to Proposition 30, it suffices to show
that for each CQ Q and a tuple ~t such that ~t ∈ cert(Q,O,D):
if O ∪ V ∪ [Q(~t)] 6|= [P (~s)] for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D), then ~t ∈ cert(Q,O,V). (11)
Observe the following.
(O1) W.l.g. we can assume that V ∩ HO,D ⊆ [Q(~t)].
(O2) IfH is as defined in Algorithm 1,HO,D ⊆ H andH\HO,D consists of unary atoms only over fresh predicates introduced
into OE at Line 1.
(O3) No rule of OE can be applied to V .
Assume that Q(~t) satisfies the “if”-clause of Equation (11). Since by the assumption ~t ∈ cert(Q,O,D), then there is a
homomorphism h fromHO,[Q(~t)] intoHO,D. It is easy to see that
h : HO,[Q(~t)] → HO,D iff h : HOE ,[Q(~t)] → HOE ,D.
We are going to use the following notations.
• DenoteHOE ,[Q(~t)] as B.
• Let X be a dataset and d an element occurring in X . Then we define the set concX (d) as {A | A(d) ∈ X}.
We are going to show the existence of a homomorphism g : B → V , which would prove that Q satisfies the “then”-clause
of Equation (11). Let d1, . . . , dm be all the fresh constants from [Q(~t)], let d be an element from [Q(~t)], and let h be a
homomorphism from B intoH. We claim that there exists g that satisfies the following properties:
1. If d is from O ∪D, then g(d) = d.
2. Let d = di and h(di) = a. Then g(di) = a′ such that a′ ∈ σa, a′ 6= a and concS(a′) = concB(d), where σa is a set of
all “copies” of a introduced by the algorithm (for example, see sub-routines in Algorithm 2).
It remains to show that g does indeed exist and map B into V . To this end, we need to show that
1. for each element d from [Q(~t)], there is an element a′ in V satisfying the second property of g, and
2. for each binary atom R(d1, d2) ∈ [Q(~t)], there exists a corresponding binary atom R(g(d1), g(d2)) ∈ V .
The former requirement follows from the construction of V . The latter one requires that
cert(P,OE ,V ∪ g(B)) = ∅. (12)
Note that Equation 11 implies that cert(P,OE ,V ∪B) = ∅. Also observe that no rule from OE is applicable to V ∪B. Indeed,
no rule is applicable to V nor to B by construction. Assume that a rule r is applicable to V ∪ B. If the body of r contains one
atom, then we immediately obtain a contradiction. If the body of r contains two atoms then there exist an atom f1 ∈ V and an
atom f2 ∈ B such that f1 ∧ f2 is an instantiation of the body of r. Assume that the atom in the body of r corresponding to f1
is a guard of the rule; then all constants occurring in f2 occur in f1 too. Since B and V share only “active” constants (i.e., the
ones from I), we have that f2 ∈ V ∩ B (due to Observation (O1)), and thus r is applicable to V , which gives a contradiction.
Assume that Equation 12 does not hold. Hence, there is a rule r ∈ O applicable to V ∪ g(B). Recall that r is not applicable
to V . We have the following cases depending on the shape of r.
1. r is of the form A(x) → C(x), A(x) ∧ B(x) → C(x), or A ∧ B(x) → C(x). Clearly, in this case r is applicable to
g(B). It is easy to see that r is then applicable to B since concB(d) = concV(g(d)) for every d in B, which contradicts
the observation above.
2. r is of the form R(x, y) → Head(~x) or A ∧ R(x, y) → Head(~x), where Head(~x) is of one of the following forms for
some unary C of binary Q predicate: C(x), C(y), Q(x, y), or Q(y, x). Here we obtain a contradiction similarly to the
previous case.
3. r is of the form R(x, y) ∧A(x)→ Head(~x). There are three cases.
(a) There are a, b, and di such that R(a, b) ∈ V and A(di) ∈ B, where g(di) = a. Since r is not applicable to B, then for
any element c occurring in B, it is the case that R(di, c) /∈ B. Thus, δR(di) /∈ B and consequently δR(a) /∈ V . The
latter statement contradicts the assumption that R(a, b) ∈ V .
(b) There are a, b′, and di such that R(di, b′) ∈ B and A(a) ∈ V , where g(di) = a. Since r is not applicable to B, then
A(di) /∈ B and thus A(g(di)) /∈ V . This contradicts that A(a) ∈ V .
(c) there are a, b, b′, di, and dj such that R(di, b′) ∈ B, A(dj) ∈ B, g(di) = g(dj) = a, and g(b′) = b. Then we
conclude that concB(di) = concB(dj) and consequently A(di) ∈ B. If Head(di, b′) is equal to C(di) or C(b′)
for some unary predicate C, then C ∈ concB(di) or C ∈ concB(b′), respectively, and thus C(g(di)) ∈ V or
C(g(b′)) ∈ V , respectively. If Head(di, b′) is equal to Q(di, b′) for some binary predicate Q, then δQ ∈ concB(di)
and ρQ ∈ concB(b′), and thus δQ(g(di)) and ρQ(g(b′)) are in V; therefore, CheckRole sub-routine of the algorithm
would return True on input (Q(g(di), g(b′)),V), and thus Q(g(di), g(b′)) ∈ V . Anyway, the obtained contradictions
conclude the case.
4. r is of the form R(x, y) ∧A(y)→ Head(~x). This case is analogous to the previous one.
Finally, g(f) should be in V for each binary atom f ∈ B, since (i) Equation (12) holds and (ii) binary atoms that do not
discover the policy were exhaustively added to V .
Regarding the size of the V , if a is a constant occurring in I and C a set of unary predicates A such that A(a) ∈ H, then
the number of “copies” of a added by the algorithm is equal to a number of subsets of C closed under OE (see Algorithm 2).
Clearly, this number is exponential in |O| and polynomial in |D| (see Definition 31).
Multi-linear, tree-shaped CQE instance. Let a DPI I = (O,D, P ) be such that O is multi-linear Datalog. Let V be a dataset
returned by Algorithm 1. For every constant a, the set σa contains the constant aA∗ such that A∗ is a maximal subset of
{A | A(a) ∈ HO,D} closed under OE . It is easy to check that the number of such subsets is polynomial in the size of O. The
setA∗ is a maximal set of labels (i.e., unary predicates) among all constants in σa, i.e., if a′ ∈ σa, then {A | A(a′) ∈ V} ⊆ A∗
for some A∗. We will also denote as a∗ an element of σa such that concV(a∗) = A∗.
Let b be a constant from I and let a′ be from σa such that R(a, b) is in HOE ,D. Since I is multi-linear, O does not include
rules with bodies of the form R(x, y) ∧ A(x) and thus whatever unary atoms a′ participates in, they cannot affect the atoms
b participates in. Hence we conclude that (i) if R(a′, b) is in V for some a′ ∈ σa and b from I, then so is R(a∗, b) for a
corresponding element a∗ from σa; (ii) if R(a′, b′) is in V for some a′ ∈ σa and b′ ∈ σb, then so is R(a∗, b∗) for corresponding
elements a∗ and b∗ from σa and σb, respectively. Let V∗ be a subset of V which is based on constants a from I and their
copies a∗. Clearly if, for some CQ Q(~x) , ~a ∈ cert(Q,O,D) and ~a ∈ cert(Q,O,V), then ~a ∈ cert(Q,O,V∗), which proves
optimality of V∗.
The polynomial size of V∗ follows from the observation that the sub-routine AddUnPredicates introduces only linearly
many copies of a constant a for each set of labels, including A∗.
Linear, tree-shaped CQE instance. Finally, assume that O is linear. Then, there is the unique maximal subset V0 of HOE ,D
such that cert(P,OE ,V0) = ∅, which gives the uniqueness of V .
Proposition 16. Let I = (O,D, P ) be a CQE instance over constants σ with P tree-shaped, and O′ a σ-rewriting of O s.t.
O′ |= O. If V ′ is an optimal view for I′ = (O′,D, P ), thenHO′,V′ is an optimal view for I.
Proof. First we show the confidentiality preservation of the censor. Since vcensV
′
I′ is confidentiality-preserving, we have thatO′ ∪ V ′ 6|= P (~s) for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D). Since O′ is Datalog, it is clear that HO′,V = HO′,V′ ; thus, O′ ∪ V 6|= P (~s)
for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D). But then, since P is tree-shaped and O′ is a rewriting of O we have O ∪ V 6|= P (~s) for each
~s ∈ cert(P,O,D) (see [Stefanoni et al., 2013]), as required.
Now we concentrate on the optimality of the view. Assume by contradiction that vcensVI is not optimal, then, by Propo-
sition 30, there exists a BCQ Q such that (i) O ∪ D |= Q; (ii) O ∪ V 6|= Q; and (iii) O ∪ V ∪ {Q} 6|= P (~s) for each
~s ∈ cert(P,O,D). Since O ∪ D |= Q and O′ |= O we have (iv) O′ ∪ D |= Q. Furthermore, condition (iii) implies that
O ∪ V ∪ [Q] 6|= P (~s) and since P is tree-shaped and O′ is a rewriting of O we have O′ ∪ V ∪ [Q] 6|= P (~s), which by the fact
that V |= V ′ then also implies that (v) O′ ∪ V ′ ∪ {Q} 6|= P (~s) for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D). But then, (iv) and (v) and the fact
that V ′ is optimal for I′ we must have O′ ∪ V ′ |= Q. Since V = HO′,V′ we have V |= Q, which contradicts (ii).
A.3 Proofs for Section 6
For the sake of ease in the proofs for theorems and propositions of this section we will consider only the class of BCQs with
constants. Clearly, any results obtained for this class will also hold for the class of all CQs. Before proceeding to the main
proofs, we introduce few definitions and lemmas.
Let O be a Datalog ontology and D a dataset; let Q′ be a possibly infinite set of queries such that O ∪ D |= Q for each
Q ∈ Q′. Then a censor censQ′ is defined as follows:
censQ′(Q) = True iff cert(Q,O,D) = True and [Q] 6|= Q′ for each Q′ ∈ Q′.
Lemma 32. Let I = (O,D, P ) be a CQE instance; let Υ be a pseudo-obstruction based on a subset S of Q. Then, censΥ =
censQ\S.
Proof. Let Q be a CQ such that cert(Q,O,D) = True.
Assume that censQ\S(Q) = False; this yields that [Q] |= Q′ for some Q′ ∈ Q \ S. Then there exists Q′′ ∈ Υ such that
Q′ |= Q′′ and thus [Q] |= Q′′, i.e., censΥ(Q) = False.
Assume that censΥ(Q) = False; this yields that [Q] |= Q′′ for some Q′′ ∈ Υ. Note that Q′′ ∈ Q \ S since Υ ⊆ Q \ S and
thus censQ\S(Q) = False.
The lemma above allows us to speak of obstruction censors in terms of either Υ or Q \ S, whatever way is more convenient
to show the required results. We are going to show now that a censor cens is optimal for a given CQE instance I iff there exists
a maximal subset S of Q such that cens = censQ\S. But first we need the following notion of a normalised proof.
Definition 33. Let O be a Datalog ontology, D a dataset, and G0 a goal. A proof pi of length n of G0 in O ∪ D is normalised
if there is k ≤ n such that ri ∈ O for each i < k and rj ∈ D for each j ≥ k. Moreover, the number k is called the frontier of
pi, denoted fr(pi).
Intuitively, a normalised proof pi works as follows: first we rewrite the initial query G0 over the ontology O until we obtain
the query Gfr(pi)−1 that can be mapped into D, and then we perform such a mapping applying (ri, θi) with i ≥ fr(pi). Observe
that for every Gi with i < fr(pi) it holds that O ∪Gi |= G0.
We exploit the following known result about SLD resolution over Datalog ontologies.
Lemma 34. Let O be a Datalog ontology, let D be a dataset, and let G0 be a goal such that O ∪D |= G0. Then there exists a
normalised SLD proof pi of G0 in O ∪D.
Lemma 35. Let I = (O,D, P ) be a CQE instance with O a Datalog ontology and cens a censor for O and D. Then
cens is optimal for I iff there exists a maximal subset S of Q such that (i) O ∪ S 6|= P (~s) for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D) and
(ii) cens = censQ\S.
Proof. We start with the “only if”-direction. Let us assume that such maximal subset S exists. We show that censQ\S is optimal.
First, we show that censQ\S is confidentiality preserving. Assume the contrary; then, there is a (finite) subset F of ThcensQ\S
such that O ∪ F |= P (~s) for some ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D). This yields the existence of proof pi of P (~s) in O ∪ [F], where
[F] =
⋃
Q∈F[Q]. Due to Lemma 34, we can assume that pi is normalised with frontier k + 1. Let Gk be the goal right before
frontier in pi. Since pi is normalised, thenGk is proved by using only facts from [F]. So, we can writeGk asGk = B1∧. . .∧Bm,
where each Bj is the conjunction of all atoms that are proved using facts only from a particular [Qj ]. Obviously, the order in
which these Bj are proved is irrelevant, so let us assume that all Bj have been proved except for Bi; since, the different Bj
can share variables, the remaining goal to prove may not be just Bi, but rather Biθi, with θi some substitution. We make the
following observations:
1. Biθi does not mention any constants not in O ∪ D. Indeed, for any distinct queries Qk, Qj in F we have that [Qk] and
[Qj ] only share constants from O ∪ D [Qk]; thus, if Biθi contains some constant coming from [Qj ] with j 6= i, it would
not be possible to prove Biθi using only facts from [Qi].
2. There exists a proof of P (~s) in O ∪ D such that Biθi occurs as a subgoal. We construct such proof as follows. First, we
can “reach” goalGk because it only requires rules fromO. Note also that eachBj follows fromO∪D, so we can continue
the proof by showing all Bj except for Bi. Then, we can do it in such a way we reach precisely Biθi as a subgoal.
3. Qi |= ∃∗Biθi since Biθi is provable from [Qi].
Observation 2 means that Biθi ∈ Q for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Furthermore, since the censor answers True for each Qi we have that
Biθi ∈ S. But then, O ∪ S |= P (~s), which is a contradiction.
Now we show the optimality of censQ\S. Clearly, a censor cens for I = (O,D, P ) is optimal if and only if for each CQ
Q(~x) and each ~t ∈ cert(Q,O,D) the fact that O ∪ Thcens ∪ {Q(~t)} 6|= P (~s) holds for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D) implies
that O ∪ Thcens |= Q(~t). Due to this, censQ\S is optimal if and only if for each Q such that cert(Q,O,D) = True and
O ∪ ThcensQ\S ∪ {Q} 6|= P (~s), it holds that O ∪ ThcensQ\S |= Q. Assume to the contrary that there exists a CQ Q such that
cert(Q,O,D) = True andO∪ThcensQ\S ∪{Q} 6|= P (~s), butO∪ThcensQ\S 6|= Q. The latter means that censQ\S(Q) = False,
that is, [Q] |= Q′, for some Q′ ∈ Q \ S. Recall that for any Q ∈ Q \ S it holds that O ∪ S ∪ {Q} |= P (~s) due to maximality of
S. Observe that S ⊆ ThcensQ\S ; this yieldsO∪ThcensQ\S ∪{Q} |= P (~s), which contradicts the initial assumption and concludes
the “only if”-direction.
Now we consider the “if”-direction. Let us now assume that cens is optimal, and let Q′ = {Q | cens(Q) = False}.
Consider the following subset S ofQ: S = Q\Q′. To prove the “if”-direction, it suffices to prove the following two conditions:
(i) S is a maximal subset of Q such that O ∪ S 6|= P (~s) for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D) and (ii) censQ\S = cens.
To show (i), assume that O ∪ S ∪ {Q} |= P (~s) for some ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D) and some Q ∈ Q. Clearly, since by construction
S ⊆ Thcens, it holds that O ∪ Thcens ∪ {Q} |= P (~s), and therefore cens(Q) = False, i.e. Q ∈ Q′, which implies (i).
To show (ii), let us pick an arbitrary Q such that O ∪ D |= Q but cens(Q) = False and hence Q ∈ Q′. Since cens
is optimal, we have that O ∪ Thcens ∪ {Q} |= P (~s) for some ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D), so let F be any minimal subset of Thcens
such that O ∪ F ∪ {Q} |= P (~s). Following the same arguments as we used in the “only if” direction we have that there
exists G ∈ Q \ S such that Q |= ∃∗G; since ∃∗G is part of the obstruction, then censQ\S(Q) = False. Finally, assume that
censQ\S(Q) = False; then, Q |= ∃∗G for someG ∈ Q\S. SinceQ\S ⊆ Q, we have that cens(Q) = False, as required.
Theorem 22. Let I be a Datalog CQE instance.
1. If Υ is a finite pseudo-obstruction for I, then
∨
Q∈ΥQ is an optimal obstruction for I.
2. If each pseudo-obstruction for I is infinite, then no optimal obstruction censor for I exists.
Proof. Let us prove Statement 1. Assume that Υ is a finite pseudo-obstruction. By Lemma 32, we have that censΥ = censQ\S.
By the “only if” statement in Lemma 35, we have that censQ\S is optimal. But then, since Υ is finite, then U is an obstruction.
Next, we show Statement 2. Assume by contradiction that each pseudo-obstruction is infinite, but there is an optimal censor
based on an obstruction U . Since ocensUI is an optimal censor, then the “if” direction of Lemma 35 tells us that there exists
a pseudo-obstruction Υ such that ocensUI = censΥ. We can show that then there exists a finite pseudo-obstruction which
contradicts the assumption above. Pick any CQ Q from U ; then, clearly, ocensUI (Q) = False and hence censΥ(Q) = False.
The latter implies that there exists Q′ ∈ Υ such that Q |= Q′. Let us now construct U ′ = ∨Q∈U Q′, which is finite and also a
“subset” of Υ. To obtain a contradiction, it thus suffices to show now that ocensU
′
I = censΥ. Indeed, for each CQ Q such that
cert(Q,D,O) = True (recall that ocensUI = censΥ):
• Assume that ocensUI (Q) = False; then there is Q
′ in U such that [Q] |= Q′, which yields [Q] |= Q′′ with Q′′ from U ′,
and therefore ocensU
′
I (Q) = False.
• Assume that ocensU
′
I (Q) = False; then [Q] |= Q′′ for some Q′′ in U ′, and consequently, since Q′′ ∈ Q \ S, we conclude
that censΥ(Q) = False.
The obtained contradiction concludes the proof.
Theorem 23. There is a CQE instance, which is both RL and EL, admitting an optimal view, but no optimal obstruction.
Conversely, there exists an RL CQE instance that admits an optimal obstruction, but no optimal view.
Proof. To show the first statement, consider I1 = (O1,D1, P1), where D1 = {R(a, a), A(a)}, P1 = A(a), and the guarded
RL (and EL) ontology O1 = {R(x, y) ∧ A(y)→ A(x)}. Since this CQE instance is guarded and tree-shaped, by Theorem 14
we can devise an optimal view. No optimal obstruction, however, exists, which is shown in Example 20.
To show the second statement, consider CQE instance I2 = (O2,D2, P2), with D2 = {R(a, a)}, P2 = A(a), and O2 =
{R(x1, y) ∧ R(x2, y) → x1 ≈ x2, R(x, y) → A(y)}. From [Cuenca Grau et al., 2013] we know that no optimal view exists
for this instance, and the proof can be easily extended to our framework (note that our notion of a censor vcensVI based on a
view V differs from the one in [Cuenca Grau et al., 2013] ) extends also to the case where views are not required to be sound.
However, U = A(a) ∨ ∃x.R(x, a) is an optimal obstruction, since there is only one proof of A(a) with subgoal R(x, a).
Theorem 25. Let I = (O,D, P ) be a linear Datalog CQE instance, and let S be the set of all nodes in the proof graph of
O ∪D on the paths from facts P (~a) with any tuple of constants ~a to >. Then, the Boolean UCQ
U =
∨
G∈S\{>} ∃
∗G
is an optimal obstruction computable in polynomial time, and ocensUI is the unique optimal censor for I.
Proof. Optimality and uniqueness follows from Theorem 22 and the facts that (i) the set S is exactly Q (ii) the only maximal
subset S of Q such that O ∪ S does not entail any P (~s) is the empty set. To prove the former fact, first observe that any goal
that can appear in any SLD proof inO∪D is isomorphic to one of the nodes of the proof-graph ofO∪D; then Fact (i) follows
directly from the construction of the proof-graph. Fact (ii) follows from the observation that each SLD proof in case of linear
O is normalised, and therefore for each Q ∈ S it holds that O ∪Q |= P (~s) for some ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D).
Finally, polynomiality follows from the fact that in linear Datalog the size of the proof-graph is at most cubic in |O∪D|.
Theorem 27. Every QL CQE instance admits a unique optimal censor based on an obstruction that can be computed in
polynomial time.
Proof. Let I = (O,D, P ) be a CQE instance with O in QL. Let cens′ be the optimal censor for I′ = (Ξσ(O),D, P ), where σ
is a set of constants of I and Ξσ(O) is a linear Datalog ontology. By Theorem 25, cens′ = ocensUI′ for the UCQ U as defined
in the theorem. Let cens = ocensUI . We are going to show that cens is an optimal censor for I.
Confidentiality preservation. Assume that cens is not confidentiality preserving for I, that is, O ∪ Thcens |= P (~s) for some
~s ∈ cert(P,O,D). This means that there existQ1, . . . , Qn ∈ Thcens such thatO∪{Q1, . . . , Qn} |= P (~s); clearly,O∪D |= Qi
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Proposition 18, Ξσ(O) |= O and consequently Ξσ(O) ∪ D |= Qi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since
cens′ is confidentiality preserving for I′, we conclude that {Q1, . . . , Qn} 6⊆ Thcens′ , so there is j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
cens′(Qj) = False; i.e., [Qi] |= U . The last entailment implies that cens(Qj) = False, i.e., Qj /∈ Thcens, which yields a
contradiction and thus cens is confidentiality preserving for I.
Optimality. Assume, for the sake of getting a contradiction, that cens is not optimal for I, that is, there exists Q such that
(i) O∪D |= Q, (ii) Q /∈ Thcens, and (iii) O∪Thcens ∪ {Q} 6|= P (~s) for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D). This yields [Q] |= u for some
disjunct u in U and consequently cens′(Q) = False. Note that for each disjunct u in U , it holds that Ξσ(O) ∪ {u} |= P (~s)
for some ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D); thus Ξσ(O) ∪ {Q} |= P (~s). There are the following cases depending on the form of u.
• If u is of the formA(a) orR(a, b) with a, b ∈ σ, thenO∪{u} |= P (~s) since, due to Proposition 18, Ξσ(O) is a σ-rewriting
of O; thus, O ∪ {Q} |= P (~s) which yields a contradiction with (iii).
• If u is of the form ∃y.R(a, y) with a ∈ σ, then let Omin be a minimal subset of Ξσ(O) such that Omin ∪ {u} |= P (~s).
Due to the assumption, it holds O ∪ {u} 6|= P (~s); thus, Omin 6⊆ O and therefore Omin includes one of the rules
introduced by Ξ. That is, Omin contains (some of) the following rules that come from the Skolemisation Ξσ(r) of some
rule r = A(x)→ ∃y.[S(x, y) ∧B(y)] of Type (3) in O:
A(x)→ PS(x, cA,S), PS(x, y)→ S(x, y), and PS(x, y)→ B(y). (13)
Consider a proof pi = G0 → . . .→ Gn of P (~s) in Ξσ(O) ∪ [∃y.R(a, y)], where G0 = P (~s). Clearly, Gi can be obtained
from Gi−1 by applying a rule from Omin for each i = 1, . . . , n− 1, and Gn−1 = R(a, x′) for some x′ since the last step
of the proof is applying the only rule from [∃y.R(a, y)]. Let Gk be the first goal in pi obtained from Gk−1 by applying a
rule from Equation (13); clearly, O ∪ {∃∗Gk−1} |= ∃∗G0. We have the following cases.
– Assume that we apply the third rule from Equality (13) to Gk−1 = B(b) for some constant b (note that a goal B(x)
with x a Skolem constant cannot appear by applying QL rules except for Type (3)). Then Gk = PS(x, b), and the
only rule that has PS in its head is the first one from Equality (13); however, this rule cannot be applied to Gk since
we cannot unify b and cA,S . Thus, this case is invalid.
– Assume that we apply the second rule from Equality (13) to Gk−1 = S(b, d) for some constants b and d. This case is
always invalid due to the same reason as the previous one.
– Assume that we apply the third rule from Equality (13) to Gk−1 = S(b, x) for some constant b and Skolem constant
x. Then,Gk = PS(b, x) andGk+1 is obtained fromGk by applying the first rule from Equation (13); that is,Gk+1 =
A(b). But then we have that A(x) → ∃y.[S(x, y) ∧ B(y)] ∈ O and consequently O ∪ {A(b)} |= ∃∗Gk−1. W.l.o.g.
we can assume that starting from Gk+1 rules only from O are used, which means that O ∪ [∃y.R(s, y)] |= A(b).
– No other case is possible.
Thus O ∪ {u} |= P (~s) which contradicts (iii).
Thus, cens is optimal for I, which concludes the proof.
B Appendix (Algorithms)
Algorithm 1: Compute an optimal view for a guarded tree-shaped CQE instance
INPUT : a guarded CQE-instance I = (O,D, P )
OUTPUT: a dataset V
1 OE := O ∪
⋃
binaryR inO{R(x, y)→ δR(x), R(x, y)→ ρR(y)};
2 H := the minimal Herbrand model for OE and D;
3 V := a maximal subset of unary atoms fromH s.t. cert(P,OE ,V) = ∅;
4 for each constant a fromH do V := AddUnPredicates(a)
5 for each R(a, b) ∈ H such that R is not ≈ do V := AddBinPredicates(R(a, b))
6 return V;
Algorithm 2: Sub-routines for Algorithm 1
Sub-routine AddUnPredicates
INPUT : a constant a
OUTPUT: a dataset V ′
1 V ′ := V;
2 C := {A | A(a) ∈ H};
3 σa := {a};
4 for each subset Sub of C closed under OE do
5 create a globally fresh copy aSub of a;
6 if OE ∪ V ′ ∪ {A(aSub) | A ∈ Sub} 6|= P (~s) for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D) then
7 V ′ := V ′ ∪ {A(aSub) | A ∈ Sub};
8 σa := σa ∪ {aSub};
9 return V ′;
Sub-routine AddBinPredicates
INPUT : a binary atom R(a, b)
OUTPUT: a dataset V ′
1 V ′ := V;
2 for each pair a∗ ∈ σa and b∗ ∈ σb do
3 if CheckRole(R(a∗, b∗),V ′) then V ′ := V ′ ∪ {R(a∗, b∗)}
4 return V ′;
Sub-routine CheckRole
INPUT : a binary atom R(a, b), a dataset V ′
OUTPUT: True or False
1 if OE ∪ V ′ ∪ {R(a, b)} 6|= P (~s) for each ~s ∈ cert(P,O,D)
2 and OE ∪ V ′ ∪ {R(a, b)} |= C(c) implies C(c) ∈ V for any unary predicate C then
3 return True;
4 else return False
C Appendix (Reduction)
In this section, we show the reduction of the problem of uniform boundedness for binary Datalog to the problem of existence
of optimal obstructions for Datalog CQE instances (see Section 6).
Let O be a binary Datalog ontology over a signature Σ (observe that w.l.o.g. we can assume that O is connected). Then, O
is uniformly bounded if there is a constant N such that for every dataset D over Σ and for every ground atom P (~t), if the atom
has a proof from O and D, then it has a proof not longer than N . It is well known that each relation P (~x) defined by O is
equivalent to an infinite union of CQs
∨∞
i=1 ϕ
P
i (~x). Note that each ϕ
P
i (~x) is a result of applying some sequence of rules fromO to P (~x). Moreover,
(P1) a Datalog ontology is uniformly bounded if and only if there exists a number N such that each P (~x) is equivalent to∨N
i=1 ϕ
P
i (~x).
Now we are ready to provide the required reduction. Let O be a binary Datalog ontology. We are going to construct a CQE
instance I = (O′,D, P ) which admits an optimal obstruction if and only if O is uniformly bounded. The ontology O′ of I is
defined as
O ∪ {RA1 (a, x) ∧A(x)→ P | A is unary and A ∈ Σ}
∪ {RS1 (a, x1) ∧RS2 (a, x2) ∧ S(x1, x2)→ P | S is binary and S ∈ Σ},
where all RA1 and R
S
i and P are fresh predicates. The dataset D is equal to
{A(a), S(a, a) | A is a unary and S is a binary predicates from Σ′} ∪ {P},
where Σ′ is Σ extended with fresh predicates RQi . Observe that this dataset admits any possible proof of P .
Let Q \ S are built as in Definition 21. It is easy to see that Q \ S contains the queries ψAi and ψSi of the form ∃x.RA(a, x)∧
ϕAi (x) and ∃x1∃x2.RS1 (a, x1) ∧RS2 (a, x2) ∧ ϕSi (x1, x2), respectively, for each A,S ∈ Σ as each of them with the help of O′
compromises the policy.
Assume that O is not uniformly bounded; then, due to Property (P1), there is some Q ∈ Σ such that for any number N
we have that
∨N
i=1 ϕ
Q
i (~x) 6≡
∨∞
i=1 ϕ
Q
i (~x). That is, it is not the case that for each ϕ
Q
i there exists ϕ
Q
j with j ≤ N such that
there is a homomorphism from ϕQj (~x) to ϕ
Q
i (~x) (note that here distinguished variables are mapped into themselves). This
immediately yields that it is not the case that for each number N and for each ψQi there exists ψ
Q
j with j ≤ N such that
there is a homomorphism from ψQj to ψ
Q
i (note that, although here we do not have distinguished variables, we still have that
the variables of ψQj that correspond to distinguished variables of ϕ
Q
j (~x) are mapped to the variables of ψ
Q
i that correspond to
distinguished variables of ϕQi (~x) since they are “marked” by predicates R
Q
i ). Moreover, for every predicate T different from
Q, it holds that for any i and any j there is no homomorphism from ψQi to ψ
T
j since the former one mentions the predicate
RQ1 and the latter one R
T
1 . Hence, there is no finite pseudo-obstruction for I and therefore, due to Theorem 22, no optimal
obstruction censor for I exists.
Assume thatO is uniformly bounded andN is a number such that for any dataset, if a fact can proved fromO and the dataset,
then there is a proof of this fact not longer than N . Let T be a subset of Q \ S consisting of those Boolean CQs ∃∗G, where
G is a sub-goal in some proof of P in O′ ∪ D of length not longer than N + 3. We claim that the UCQ U = ∨ϕ∈T ϕ is an
optimal obstruction for I. Assume that there exists a Boolean CQ ψ = ∃∗G0 fromQ \S with G0 a sub-goal coming from some
proof of length greater than N + 3. This means that O′ ∪ S ∪ {ψ} |= P . Than there exists a proof pi of P from O′ ∪A, where
A = [ψ]∪⋃ϕ∈S[ϕ], of length no longer than N + 3 (1 step to apply one of the rules RS1 (a, x1)∧RS2 (a, x2)∧ S(x1, x2)→ P
from O′, N steps to proof S(x1, x2) using rules from O∪A, and 2 additional steps to proof RS1 (a, b1)∧RS2 (a, b2) using facts
from A for some elements b1 and b2). W.l.o.g., we can assume that this proof is normalised. Recall that all the rules that are
applied after the frontier are from A. We can assume w.l.o.g. that rules from [ψ] are applied only at the very end of the proof.
Clearly, the goal G right before we start to apply the rules from [ψ] is such that (i) ∃∗G ∈ T and (ii) there is a homomorphism
from ∃∗G to ψ. These properties imply that T is a pseudo-obstruction and, since it is finite, by Theorem 22 we have that an
optimal obstruction censor for I exists.
